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Is There One Right Answer to the 
Question of the Nature of Law? 
Dan Priel* 
Sir James Stephen is not the only writer whose attempts to analyze legal ideas 
have been confused by striving for a useless quintessence of all systems, instead 
of an accurate anatomy of one. 
(Holmes 1897: 475). 
In Europe, charters ofliberry have been granted by power. America has set the 
example ... of charters of power granted by liberry. 
(James Madison, quoted in Bailyn 1992: 55). 
1. Introduction 
For some time during the late 1970s and early 1980s Ronald Dworkin's claim that 
there are uniquely right answers to virtually all legal questions was the subject of 
heated debate. But as often happens with such debates, it eventually ran out of 
steam, even though neither side succeeded in convincing the other. It may therefore 
seem a bit odd to return to this topic now. IfT do so, it is because I wish to examine 
it from an angle that I think it has not yet been looked at, and which I think is 
relevant to some debates that are ve1y much alive these days. More specifically, 
I will argue that there is something about the right answer thesis that fits a certain 
view prevalent in American political culture about politics and (consequencly) 
about the relationship between law and politics, and that this view is quite different 
from the British mainstream view about law and politics. The more general and 
more important goal of this chapter is to challenge the underlying idea of the search 
for the na~ure oflaw, at least so long as it is understood as a conceptual inquiry char 
purports to tell something about law outside the different political and cultural 
environrrienrs in which different legal systems operate. Somewhat surprisingly, 
* I rhank participants at the Nature of Law Conference at McMaster University for their comments, 
and especially to my commentator at the conference, Kevin Walton, and to Stefan Sciata.ffa, for his 
detailed written comments. 
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many of the very same legal theorists who have argued vigorously against the view 
that there is a single right answer to legal questions accepted (or actually, assumed) 
this position at the meta-level inquiiy on the nature of law. I think this is 
assumption is mistaken, and my chapter is an attempt to ·explain why. 
2. Changing places 
Returning to his native Britain after a year in the United States, Hart recorded his 
impressions for the BBC. 1 These were then published in the BBC's magazine The 
Listener. This brief piece, "A View of America/' reflects Han's astonishment with 
what he saw there. Coming from a country that was still slowly recovering from two 
wars thaL had left it practically bankrupt, H art was dearly enthralled about the tall 
buildings, the wide roads, the big cars, and the bountiful universities. But apart 
from that, the essay also contains some pertinent comments about American 
politics and how different they were from what he was used to at home. One 
thing that particularly impressed Hart was 
I 
the passion inspiring so many whom you meet for the moral issue. Argument soon breaks 
through co what is believed, apparently, to be at the root of every problem-a moral 
problem. And, more widespread than I could have believed, was the conviction that just as 
there lurks at the bottom of almost every problem a moral question, so there must somewhere 
be an answer, an answer perhaps for the sage-and he may be in the university- to provide. 
(Hart 1958: 89)2 
This is also a fairly neat summary ofDworkin's right answer thesis. This description 
would not be so surprising to those who know something about the debates that 
would come to dominate legal philosophy in the following decades had it not been 
for the fact that Hart wrote chis some five years before Ronald Dworkin published 
his first article. And yet Hart was not talking here not about American law but on 
American policies. This, as l will try to show, is not a coincidence. 
Unlike Hart, who only made a few visits to the United States, Dworkin lived and 
taught in Britain for many years. But he always remained, I think, a relative outsider 
to the legal and political culture in Britain. He has been, for example, a frequent 
commentator on American constitutional cases in the New York Review of Books, 
but to the best of my knowledge has never written a similar essay on a British case. 
He has seen enough, however, to note the differences in the political cultures of the 
two countries, writing once that "public debate in the United States is dominated, 
to a degree British commentarors find surprising, by discussion of what rights 
1 Though what I write about may be more accurately described as English, throughout the chapter 
l mostly talk about Britain and British law. Those troubled by this term should read "England" and 
"English law" instead wherever these terms appear. Though less loaded, "American law" is also not free 
from difficulties. Again, I stuck wirh chis phrase aware of its imprecision. I believe chat in neither case 
does my choice of word get in the way of my argument. 
2 Surprisingly, even though Nicola Lacey discusses this little essay at some length in her biography 
of Hart (2006: 193- 6), she does not ,mention this remarkable passage. 
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people have" (Dworkin 1985: 31-2). Dworkin's most derailed discussion of British 
law and politics is found in a relatively unknown pamphlet (or is it a book?) entitled 
A Bill of Rights for Britain. Summarized in a sentence, in this essay Dworkin 
recommends that Britain's law and politics be turned into something more or 
less like their American counterparts. He writes there that in order for people to 
"participate in government ... constantly through informed and free debate ... 
Parliament must be constrained in certain ways in order that democracy be genuine 
rather than a sham" (Dworkin 1990: 33, emphasis in original).3 Such a change, he 
suggested, might make "[!Jaw and lawyers ... begin to play a different, more 
valuable role in [British] society than they now even aim to have." It would 
encourage courts to "think more in terms of principle and less in terms of narrow 
precedent." Such a change would help foster "a legal profession that could be the 
conscience, not just the servant, of government and indusuy" (Dworkin 1990: 23). 
In short, Dworkin recognized that there are fundamental differences in the political 
culture of Britain and the United States, and that those had fundamental implica-
tions for the way lawyers perceived their role in society. 
3. Two ways to the rule of law 
I want to suggest that these reflections on the political differences between the 
United States and Britain that both Hart and Dworkin noticed are relevant to legal 
philosophy. At this stage I will phrase my argument as weakly as I can: since law 
interacts with politics, the fact that different political communities have different 
conceptions of politics is likely to have an impact on their conception of law as well. 
I will examine this argument in rhe concext of one aspect of the rnle of law, namely 
that of the requirement that the content of the law not be affected by the identity of 
the person charged with expressing it. This sense is sometimes captured by the 
slogan "the rule of law and not of men," and is associated with one sense of 
objectivity, that of non-perspectival constancy or invariance. Put in eve1yday terms, 
it is the demand that if different people are asked to state what the law says on a 
particular question, they will (typically) offer tbe same answer, even if their political 
views are different. (This, of course, is not the only sense of the rule of law.) 
When legal philosophers address the question they usually do so by trying to 
connect debates about objectivity in law to the subtle and sophisticated discussions 
of objectivity among philosophers where the topic has been front and center of 
virtually every field of philosophy. These jurisprudential contributions provided 
important correctives to those who rejected the possibility of objective knowledge 
as naive or even reactionaiy. However, in focusing on the question of objectivity in 
these senses they shifted attention away from the issues that lawyers are mostly 
interested in. For lawyers do not usually wonder about whether Truth exists, or the 
ontological building blocks of Reality, bur they are intensely interested, practically 
3 These days Dworkin (2011: 398-9) has somewhat softened his support for judicial review. 
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interested, in potential problems that could undermine objectivity in the sense 
I associated with the rule of law. The worry is that people's personal (possibly 
unconscious) prejudices, their political opinions, or cultural background, will affect 
their determination of the law thereby undermining the possibility of invariance 
among different people. 
The unique problem of objectivity in law can thus be summarized as follows: (1) 
law should be (in the specific sense explained above) objective; (2) law (in modern 
society) primarily is concerned, directly or indirectly, with the relationship between 
individual and the state; (3) questions of this sort are often politically controversial; 
( 4) legal provisions are often written in vague language that can be interpreted in 
different ways, and therefore (5) law's objectivity is in danger. More informally, the 
worry is that, especially in the modern welfare state, there is tension between the 
aims for objectivity jn the law and many of the issues it is made to handle. 
Setting up the problem at this level of abstraction is fairly easy. What makes 
finding a solution to it difficult is that the issue is not simply one of finding the 
optimal design of legal institutions to minimize a dearly set problem. Part of the 
difficulty arises from the fact that the understanding of the problem itself changes in 
different political environments, and therefore that there are several possible ways of 
understanding what would count as a successful solution to it. One way of 
understanding my argument below is that we can identify a difference in the 
mainstream legal academic positions in Britain and the United States not simply 
about the means of achieving an agreed optimal level of separation between law and 
polirics, but on what kind of relationship between law and politics is desirable. To 
complete my argument about the error in the way debates about the nature of law 
are currently conducted I will need to show, first, that the relationship between law 
and politics is relevant to debates about the nature of law; and second, that different 
answers to this matter- and as a result different understandings of the nature of 
law-are going to be given in different political cultures. 
My argument below can be summarized as follows. I will first argue that the 
British response to the problem identified above is to uy and keep law away from 
political questions, whereas the American response has seen various attempts for 
allowing courts to address political questions without entering the political fray. 
I will then argue that we can see exactly these different responses in the respective 
works of Hart and Dworkin.· The third step is to show that these competing views 
mark competing understandings of what law is, which at least in part are the result 
of competing understandings of politics. 
3.1. The British response 
The traditional, and still typical, response in Britain to the potential challenge that 
politics poses co the rule of law is co insist on a categorical separation of law and 
politics. "To call a court 'political' is merely to deny it the character of a court of 
law" (Oalceshott 1975: 412). This distinction is maintained through the more or 
less conscious adoption of various institutional mechanisms aimed at minimizing 
the potential infiltration of politics into the law, and no less importantly, oflaw into 
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poHtics. Some of these means for achieving rhar goal are rather familiar, others 
perhaps less so. I mention only a few of them here: 
(1) Parliamentary supremacy. In the course of a discussion of rhe differences 
between the United States and Britain Hart wrote how the "defenders of the British 
governmenc>s policy had come ro think nor merely rhar Parliament had unlimited 
legislative powers as a matter of English constitutional law but that it was a general[,] 
necessary and indeed self-evident rrurh rhat government by law could not be 
limited by law,, (Hart 1976: 5 51). Hart's point was that though the matter was 
presented as a conceptual truth ir was merely a reflection of a particular political 
choke, one that could be easily refoted by pointing, a~ Hart himseJf did in his 
critique of Austin, to the United States as a counterexample (Harr 1994: 72-4).4 
The fact is, however, that though there were some who sought to present the matter 
in this conceptual fashion, the opposition to legal limitations on Parliamentary 
power was always thoroughly normative. To its proponents Parliamentary sover-
eignty was a good idea.5 One of the good things about Padiamentaiy sovereignty 
was that it created a dearer separntion between legal and political matters, and made 
it less likely that courts would be embroiled in the son: of political questions that 
could compromise their objectivity. This remains a fundamental pillar of British law. 
(2) Judicial deference to government action. Another doctrine used to keep law 
and politics apart has been a very deferential approach to executive action. The 
general attitude of British courts cowards a judicial mindset has been described by a 
prominent legal historian as one of "total deference to the executive" (Stevens 1978: 
320).6 A broad doctrine of justiciability, an almost uninterrupted discretion to 
public authorities (under what British public lawyers call "Wednesbury unreason-
ableness")/ and narrow scope for tort liability of public authorities, have all served 
to keep executive action relatively free from legal oversight. Of course, one can find 
examples of all that in other places as well, but in comparison to courts in other 
Western democracies, and more specifically in cornpai·ison with American comts, 
in much of the twentieth century British courts were remarkably timid (Stevens 
2005: 31- 46). British courts did not, until the last few years, develop a detailed 
protected rights jw·isprudence that set limits to legislative and executive action, as 
these were deemed inimical to Pai·liamenta1y sovereignty. 
(3) A non-political process of judicial appointments. Judicial appointments in 
the UK are made on the basis with relatively li ttle influence by politicians, and are 
based on an assessment of the legal ability of the candidates. This, of course, 
contrasts sharply with the fashion in which judges in the US are typically 
4 Many others have made this point against Austin before Hart, e.g. Bryce (1901: 89- 94); Si~vick 
(1897: 25- 8). 
5 A sununary of the overwhelmingly political arguments against such limitations is found in 
Goldsworthy (2001: 233-4). 
G Also Stevens (1978: 388-9): "parliamentary sovereignty implied that there should be no serious 
judicial questioning not only of aces of Parliament, but of decisions of the Civil Service." 
7 So called after /l;sociated Provincial Pictm'I! Houses v. Wednesbmy Corporation, (1947) 1 KB 223 
(CA). 
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appointed, either in popular elections (in most states) or by a highly politicized 
nomination process (in the federal courts). 
(4) Focus on doctrine in legal education and legal scholarship. What does it mean 
to be a good lawyer? In the best British law schools chis still means, to a degree chat 
would astound American law professors, mastering a vase amount of legal rules by 
reading a breathtal<lng number of cases, while giving relatively little consideration 
to questions of social policy. In a l<lnd of feedback loop mechanism doctrinal legal 
education is both a product of and a mechanism for maintaining the separation of 
law from politics: today's students are lawyers and judges of the next generation, 
and they continue to litigate, interpret, and develop the law in the same fashion. 
This is not merely a matter of legal education: doctrinal, ''black-letter" scholar-
ship-ranging from the brief case note to the comprehensive treatise- is a genre 
still accorded great respect among British academics. One of the marks of this kind 
of scholarship is the view that the solution of legal problems is still primarily to be 
derived from legal materials. As a result even what counts as "theoretical" work in 
Britain is geared much more towards conceprual analysis or the internal taxonomy 
of legal categories than to the examination of the law from an interdisciplina1y 
perspective and it often lacks the explicitly normative orientation which is more 
common in American legal scholarship. This kind of scholarship fosters the view 
that law and politics are separate domains: social scientific data or political theory 
belong to politics, "internal" answers derived from the analysis oflegal materials are 
the domain of lawyers. 
3.2. The American response 
The American scene is different. It was already in the first half of the nineteenth 
century that Tocqueville famously wrote "[t]here is hardly a political question in 
the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one" (Tocque-
ville 2003: 315 [§I.2.8)).8 And this enchantment with law as a central location for 
political battle has greatly intensified since. 
One source of all these differences is the United States Constitution, understood 
primarily as a legal document that empowers courts to declare certain legislation 
unconstitutional and that has no equivalent in Britain. Another difference was 
pointed out by Hart in the ve1y same essay from which I quoted above: 
For [the English], surely, libercy is this: that there is a circle round each man, inside which he 
can do as he please, and it is no concern of others; this is the libercy the Englishman has 
inside his house and garden and behind its hedges. T think that this as an ideal makes little 
appeal to an enormous number of Americans; 1 believe you can find what the American 
means by liberty by looking at the Constitution of an American State. In the State of 
Massachusetts the Constirurion provides that any member of the public may introduce a 
8 It is true that some have questioned Tocqueville's claim (Graber 2004; cf. Schauer 2005), but 
though it is true that not all political questions become judicial questions in the United States, it is true 
that American courts have been involved in many politically contested questions, especially in 
comparison to British courts. 
l 
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measure into the Legislature and argue for it before committees. And ir seems ro me thar this 
is what an American means by liberty; the right to take part in what he would call "the 
decision-making process". (Hart 1958: 89)9 
Simply put, politics is a more participatory affair in the US than in Britain, and 
going to court is one way of participating in politics in the United States. To be 
sure, there have been many critics, both popular and academic, of the excessive 
legalism in American life, complaining about too many laws, too many lawyers, and 
too much faith in the redeeming powers of law. But these persistent complaints 
need to be repeatedly made exactly because of the staying centrality of law in 
American political life. They need to be mentioned against a background of 
statements such as "[l]itigation is an important political activity: courts exercise 
political authority, modify substantive laws, and allocate resources .... Litigation 
declares and changes fundamental cultural values" (Abel 1987: 454-5). 10 (It is hard 
to imagine such a statement being made in the British context.) 
The result of all this is a very different understanding of the relationship between 
law and politics in American law from the way this relationship is understood in 
Britain. This makes the fears oflaw becoming indistinguishable from politics more 
pressing; at the same time it implies that many of the institutional solutions for 
maintaining the rule oflaw that were adopted in British law are simply not available 
in the United States, and it requires the adoption of different institutional solutions 
to match the ve1y different problems that arise when courts actively engage in 
politics. Once again I can only mention briefly a few of them. 
(1) Giving up. Perhaps the most radical response to the difficulty is to give up 
on rhe attempt to maintain the separation between law and politics. The nomin-
ation proceeclings of Supreme Court justices are now televised and nominees are 
assessed in quite openly political terms. In many states judges are elected and can be 
removed from office by the public. There is a thriving industry of scholarship 
produced by political scientists assessing court decisions in terms of their political 
orientation, and in response to the challenge that the law is political some scholars 
have even openly celebrated the contribution ''political courts" make to the 
American polity (e.g. Pet·etti 1999). The situation in Britain could hardly be 
more different. As one of the few political scientists to take an interest in the 
workings of the courts put it, "[i]t is possible for students of British government to 
pursue their studies in blissful ignorance of the contents of even the existence of the 
law reports" (Drewry 1985: 373; Drewry 2009). Compared with literally hundreds 
9 Once again Hart captured here Dworkin's view years before he himself articulated it. Dworkin 
(2011: 365)"conrrasts one view ofliberty according to which IJberty consists in the idea that "people 
must be permitted to play a role in their own coercive governmenc: that government must in some 
sense or another be self-government" with another according to which "people must be free of coercive 
government over some substantial range of their decisions and acdvities." Dworkin, of course, defends 
the former. 
10 Or consider the following words from Bogus (2001: 41): "American common law is both more 
democratic and more dynamic rhan its British counterpart. The people play a larger role in American 
than in British common law, and the common law plays a larger role in the American than in the 
British system of governance." 
Is There One Right Answer to the Nature of Law? 329 
of books and articles by political scientists examining the extent to which courts are 
inAuenced by politics, there is an astounding dearth of studies of chis sort in Britain. 
This lack of scholarly interest can only be explained by the assumption that law and 
politics are largely separate. 
(2) Theories of interpretation. It is not often noted, but there is no British equi-
valent to American lawyers' obsession with theories of interpretation. This work, at 
both the statuco1y and constitutional level, is, at bottom, an effort to find a way to 
be able to identify the content of law in a way chat both acknowledges the political 
content of the law, but tries to keep law apart from it. This is evident in approaches 
such as originalisrn and rextualism, which are presented as the only antidotes to the 
dangers of politicization of the law. But the same is true of other approaches too. 
Dworkin, for example (whose approach I discuss below), addresses this difficulty by 
acknowledging the political character of the law, but argues that the right inter-
pretive methodology can avoid the dangers associated with political courts. These 
debates are required because of, and can be understood as institutional solutions to, 
the role of American courts in politics. 
(3) Economic analJsis of law (and "theoretical" scholarship more generalb). Economic 
analysis of law has proven a remarkable success in the United States, but it has not 
had much impact in Britain. It is tempting to explain this disparity by appeal to the 
American obsession whh theo1y and contrast it with English anti-intellectualism, 
but there is, I think, a deeper reason for this difference. In the British context 
economic analysis is perceived as an alien influence that could potentially lead to 
undermining the integrity of the law (its "self-understanding"). It is thus not merely 
pointless, it is potentially dangerous. I suspect that the success of economic analysis 
of law has much to do with the need to maintain objectivity in the face of law 
deeply infused with politics. Since doctrinal analysis is no longer perceived as 
sufficiently robust co prevent the politicization of the courts-this is the realist 
legacy that has never had much impact in Britain-economic analysis is (or was) 
conceived as a non-political alternative. At least in its initial stages, it was promoted 
for its ability to provide precision and objectivity that traditional methods of legal 
reasoning lacked. 
* * * 
I could list many other ways in which the fundamental differences in understanding 
the relationship between law and politics manifest themselves in these two legal 
systems. Political activism in the United States is quite often Legal activism; there is 
much less of that in Britain. (Of course, chis may only reflect political activists' 
prediction that such a course of action would be a waste of time and money; but 
that is exactly the point.) In addition one may mention the attitude towards judicial 
review, the different attitude towards deciding politically controversial matters 
(abortion, slave1y, health care), and consequently, the very different place of law 
in public discourse (US Supreme Court decisions are commonly front page news, 
but those of its British counterpart much more rarely) . If I were co summarize the 
difference between the two positions in a sentence I would put it this way: the study 
of the American Constirutioi:- is, by and large, a study of American constitutional 
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law; the study of the British constitution is, to a much greater degree, the study of 
British politics. 
No doubt the sketch I offered above is ve1y schematic, and on each side there is 
now growing appreciation of the virtues of the opposing view. In Britain even 
before the adoption of the H uman Rights Act there were those who sought to find a 
basis for judicial review of legislation in the principles of the common law. In the 
United States, after years in which judicial review was perceived as the greatest gift 
American politics has bestowed on the world, there are now those who argue that 
the US will be better off without it. But in both cases these are still minority views 
and they are battling very entrenched ideas. It is also possible that British law may 
be criticized by showing that all the institutional mechanisms mentioned above that 
are aimed to keep law outside politics fail to do so, and that in fact British law is no 
less political than American law. And yet at least at the level that legal philosophers 
seem to be interested in, that of officials' attitudes from the internal point of view, 
the "self-understanding" of British law(yers) is fundamentally different from that of 
American law(yers). 
4. Back to the jurisprudential fray 
I suspect the response of many legal philosophers to what I have said so far will be 
that it is all ve1y interesting, perhaps even true, but that this is not jurisprudence, 
and has little to do with its concerns. For the general view among them is that "in 
spite of many variations in different cultures and in different times, [law] has tal(en 
the same general form and structure,, (Hart 1994: 240). Most legal philosophers 
accept this statement without argument and have consequently left all the matters 
I discussed in the last section to others: this is hisro1y, or politics, or perhaps 
constitutional the01y or comparative law; this is not jurisprudence properly so 
called. 
What I will try to show is that these matters are relevant to jurisprudence, and 
indeed have in fact been at the background of some well-known jurisprudential 
debates. I begin by examining the respective views of Hart and Dworkin and show 
that they reflect very different views on the relationship between Jaw and politics, 
and ones that are in accordance with the dominant view on the matter in Britain 
and the United States, respectively. 
4.1. The different ways of understanding the connection 
between law and politics 
I began· by distinguishing between Hart and Dworkin's perceptions of the other's 
native count1y and I suggested that their respective theories of law may have been 
influenced by their perception of the law in their own native count1y. This 
suggestion is not usually well received among legal philosophers. Michael Moore, 
for instance, considered it the sort of mistake one occasionally hears from students 
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who a.re just embarking on their jurisprudential studies (Moore 2000: 80- 1; for a 
similar atti tude see Endicott 1998). Nonetheless, I will try to demonstrate that 
there may be deep and important truth in this view. 
As the quotes above demonstrate, Ha.re has clearly·recognized the differences 
between American and British political cultures, and has also recognized the very 
different role of politics in American and British law. None of chis, apparently, 
made him question the existence of a single nature to law. His brief references on 
the interaction between law and politics, made in the context of discussing 
American law (Hart 1983: 124-5) did not suggest to him that they had anything 
to do with what law is. And yet, aspects of his general account reflect the British 
approach to this relationship which he imperceptibly generalfaed to claims about 
the nature of law in general. One place where this is particularly evident is Hart's 
discussion of adjudication. It is, as he later admitted (Hart 1994: 259) a fairly 
cursory discussion (which is in itself revealing and unlikely to happen to an 
American only a few years after Brown v. Board of Education). What is found 
there is striking, for when Hart has to explain the sources of indeterminacy in the 
law, he focuses almost exclusively on the inherent vagueness of natural language 
(Hart 1994: 127- 9): It is clear that a car is a kind of vehicle, but it is less clear 
whether a bicycle is. In other words, the main source of disagreement is not political 
divergence at the foundation of the legal system (or in his terminology, different 
people having different rules of recognition due to their different political back-
grounds), but rather a local, linguistic disagreement at the periphery of law. It is 
only when law runs out and the judge is required to fiU a void when there is no 
more law to follow that she wiU have to consult her moral and political views. 
Thus, the British approach to the problem of objectivity mentioned above- thac 
of keeping law and politics separate-becomes a central tenet in Hart's account of 
the nature of law. Matters a.re very different with Dworkin. For him the constant 
contact between law and politics is perhaps the central background problem that 
calls for solution, the rnajor threat to the possibility of objective law. Tt is for this 
reason that he begins his critique of Hart by pointing out that when disagreements 
occu~· in the law their source is usually political, not linguistic. Dworkin therefore 
starts his analysis at a point that rhose who wish to maintain the separation of law 
from politics would already find unacceptable: "Judicial decisions," he says, "are 
political decisions" (Dworkin 1978: 88). Thus, the separation between law and 
politics, in the way it is understood in British law-two (largely) non-overlapping 
domains- is off the table from the stalt. Instead, Dworkin seeks to solve the 
problem of objectivity by relying on a distinction between what I will designate 
as "politics" and "Politics." (The terms are mine.) The former is what one sees on 
TV: spin, personal attacks, simplistic slogans, talking points instead of argument; it 
is also the kind of things that give politics a bad name: logrolling, filibustering, the 
adoption of unprincipled position for the sake of personal promotion. For politics 
Dworkin has nothing hue contempt. Debates preceding "legislative decision[s] 
about some great issue of principle" are "rarely" of "high quality." Rather, such 
"[o]rdinary politics generally aims ... at a political compromise that gives all power-
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ful groups enough of what they want to prevent their disaffection, and reasoned 
argument elaborating moral principles is rarely part of or even congenial to such 
compromises" (Dworkin 1996; 344-5; also Dworkin 1985: 146). By contrast, 
Politics is commitment to principle through the exploration of the moral require-
ments involved in living in a community. He says, for instance, that in a commu-
nity governed by ''the model of principle" members of the community "accept that 
they are governed by common principles, not just by rules hammered out in 
political compromise." And he adds: "Politics has a different character for such 
people. It is a theater of debate about which principles the community should adopt 
as a system ... " (Dworkin 1986: 211). ll 
What is the role of law in this? Dworkin' s answer is that law, properly under-
stood and practiced, is true Politics. The first step in the argument is that "our 
government shall be republican rather than despotic'' (Dworkin 1996: 111, also 
345, for a similar emphasis on a "republican" view oflaw), and the recognition that 
what I called "politics" "destroys civic republicanism" (Dworldn 2000: 234, also 
369, where Dworkin links the "degraded and negative" political discourse in the 
US to the claim that Americans cannot claim "with a straight face, to be governing 
[them]selves"). The second step is that law is the main means for promoting this 
republican ideal: 
We have an institution that calls some issues from the battleground of power politics to the 
forum of principle. Ir holds out the promise that the deepest, most fundamental conflicts 
between individuals and society will once, someplace, finally, become questions of justice. 
I do not call that religion or prophecy. I call it law. (Dworkin 1985: 71) 12 
Law and lawyers thus have a dual role within the American polity: one is to elevate 
politics to Politics by providing a model of what political discourse should look like; 
the other is to limit the domain of politics by transferring certain questions from 
politics to law (and thus to Politics) if politics cannot be transformed into Politics. 
The first strategy is in view in Law's Empire when Dworkin argues that political 
decision making should be based on the same principles and reasoning that guide 
legal decision maldng (Dworkin 1986: 184- 6; Dworldn 2006).13 Elsewhere 
Dworkin explains that political institutions could rise to the level of Politics only 
under what he calls "partnership democracy," which, as its name indicates, is 
distinctive for its participatoty view of democracy-one that works to encourage 
the kind of political debate he sees in judicial proceedings. 
However, when the political community fails to create this form of democracy 
Dworldn is clear in favoring the second strategy: "individual citizens can ... exercise 
11 For comparison consider Crick (2000: 32), a book that has a good claim to be the classic view of 
politics in Britain: "'Politics' ... simply summarizes an activity whose history is a mixture of accident 
and deliberate achievement .... ft is not as such motivated by principle . ... Political principles are, 
whatever they are, principles held within politics." See also Crick (2000: 47). 
12 Dworkin (1996: 345) offers a (highly romantic) explanation of how law achieves this. Friedman 
(2004: 1290-1) makes precisely the same point. 
13 I criticize the position of Dworkin (2006) in Priel (2007a). 
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the moral responsibilities of citizenship better when final decisions involving 
constitutional values are removed from ordinaiy politics and assigned to courts, 
whose decisions are meant to turn on principle, not on the weight of numbers or 
the balance of political influence" (Dworkin 1996: 344; also' Dworkin 1978: 85). 
The judge's role in this debate is not chat of a follower (of rules set elsewhere), but 
primarily as that of a moral leader. For chis reason we even find in Dworkin, an 
exhortation for (as Hart put it) "the sage ... [who] may be in the university" to 
provide the right answer to political questions. 14 
Accepting that, the question still remains how we can know-even in a pai·tner-
ship democracy-that such debates would give us the objectively right answer to 
the questions of Politics. The ai1swer, quite simply, is that the right answer is the 
best answer to come our of the debate. This crucial point about Dworkin's position is 
central to his thinking: the right answer is not "out there," it is simply what emerges 
as the "winner" in a principled debate. It is always a tentative winner, because it is 
always open to challenge, but an objectively right answer rneans, for him, nothing 
more than the best answer so fai· found, the one that we have been convinced cannot 
be successfully challenged, in proper political (i.e. Political) discourse. 
What is often missed in jurisprudential discussions of Dworkin's work is the 
extent to which his account reflects a view that is fairly familiai· within American 
legal discourse. To see this we must step outside the naiTow bounds of analytic 
jurisprudence, although because of space limits I can provide here only one detailed 
example. 15 In an essay first published in 1981 (now reprinted in Fiss 2001) Owen 
Fiss has sought to address the challenge to objectivity posed by certain then-
emerging critical scholars. Proponents of this "new nihilism" contended, as Fiss 
put it, that "[a]ll law is masked power" (Fiss 2001: 151). Fiss's response was 
somewhat different from Dworkin's: unlike the latter who denied the intelligibility 
of external criticism Fiss acknowledged it and even relied on it to distinguish 
between internal legal criticism and external ethical (or religious) criticism. But 
what looks at first like a significant difference turns out to be quite small, for as Piss 
put it, "[e]ndogenous change is always preferred ... [and therefore t]he external 
critic struggles to work within the law ... " (Fiss 2001: 159; also 160-2, for an 
elaboration on the ways in which appeal to morality is required to maintain the 
objectivity of law). 
One need not accept Fiss's romanticized view of American law co recognize in his 
words a particular vision of addressing the challenge to the objectivity of law, one 
14 Recall: "The courts arc the capitals oflaw's empire, and judges are its princes, but not its seers and 
prophets. It falls ro philosophers, if they are willing, to work out law's ambitions for icself, the purer 
form of law within and beyond che law we have" (Dworkin 1986: 407). To the same effect, Dworkin 
(2011: 109). 
l5 Another Famous example char is superficially very different but bears some deep unmistakable 
resemblance to Dworkin's ideas is Wechsler (1958), contrasting "the ad hoc in politics" with the 
"judicial process ... that ... muse be genuinely principled" (l 958: 15), and who, interestingly, con-
trasted his approach to that caken by the House of Lords (1958: 17). There are also looser links 
between Dworkin's idea and much other work that has sought to reconcile the republican ideal of 
self.government of "We che people" of the Constitution with the higher law, the "unalienable Rights," 
mentioned in che Declaration of independence, and the role of law in answering this question. 
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that seeks to find it through engagement in moral and political debate within an 
"interpretive community" (Fiss 2001: 170). The judges' authority derives from the 
face chat they "are insulated from the political process" (i.e. what I called politics), 
but that is so in order for them "ro engage in a special kind of dialogue over the 
meaning of [public] values" (i.e. what I called Politics). This judicial engagement 
with public values is "an essential part of the process through which a morality evolves 
and retains its public character" (Fiss 2001: 199). For chis reason "courts should not 
be viewed in isolation but as a coordinate somce of governmental power, and as an 
integral part of the larger political system" (Fiss 2001: 54, also 34-5).16 
The view reflected here, then, is not simply that moraliry contains right answers 
to moral questions, and since morality is part of the law, law contains right 
answers too. (Note also that it has nothing to do with whether motality is a 
condition of validity.) At bottom Dworkin's view holds that law can transform 
political debate and in this way avoid the probkm of objectivity: following his 
prescription is what it means to find the right answer co moral questions. If one 
accepts this view the audacious right answer thesis becomes trivial, you might even 
say tautological. But in the Hardan perspective it is almost incomprehensible. 
Because Hart does not recognize the distinction between two kinds of politics, on 
his view when politics is introduced into the law, political disagreement is simply 
"reproduced" in the law. It is hard to see how that could aid the search for legally 
correct right answers or guarantee the objectivity oflaw. This view is evident when 
Hart criticizes those who think chat "there is no central element of actual law to be 
seen in the core of central meaning which rules have, that there is nothing in the 
nature of a legal rule inconsistent with all questions being open to reconsideration 
in the light of social policy" (1983: 72, emphasis in original; Shapiro 2011: 327-9, 
argues against Dworkin on the basis of a similar attitude). For Hart to recognize the 
existence of law is to recognize a domain in which politics, even Politics ("social 
policy"), cannot touch. 17 
4.2. Legal validity? 
What we have seen so far is that the relative sepatation oflaw and politics in English 
law replicates itself in Hart's account of the nature of law, whereas the deep ties 
between law and politics in American law are at the heart of Dworkin' s theory of 
law. That chis fact has not received much attention is not, I think, a coincidence. 
Unlike Lhe connections between law and morality, the interaction between law and 
16 Anoth~r similar suggestion is found in Barber and Fleming (2007: 156): the right approach co 
conscitulional interpretation, they say, "can only mean an interpretation of the Constitution that cries 
to redeem its expressed claim to be an instrument of justice, the general welfare, and the other goods 
listed in the Preamble." Such examples could be easily multiplied. 
17 The t:wo jurisprudential views thus reflect two opposed views on rhe place of law in practical 
reasoning. Hart's positivism sees law as concerned with guidance, and dear guidance requires replacing 
moral reasons. Dworkin's view sees law as concerned with participation and ultimately in self-
governmenr, and hence sees the point oflaw in engaging people Jn moral reasons. The issue is explored 
more fully in Pricl (2012b). 
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politics has been marginalized in analytic jurisprudence. Perhaps this reflects the 
dominant view thal morality is constant and therefore the relationship between it 
and law is (fairly) constant too. (This is true also of moral anti-realist legal 
philosophers such as Kelsen or Alf Ross. 18) As such the' law/morality borderline 
seems to match an inquiry into the nature of law (as currently understood) much 
more than the shifting boundary between law and politics. But in ignoring the law/ 
politics divide legal philosophers may have missed the most important challenge to 
their search for a single nature to law. The purpose of this section is to show in what 
way the differences identified above between British and American law about the 
place of politics, and the corresponding differences between Hart and Dworkin, 
reflect a difference that does not merely reflect different variations on a single nature 
of law, but must be understood as competing amwers to the question "What is law?" 
To the extent that the question of the relationship between law and politics is 
addressed in jurisprudential literature it is typically located in the rule of recognition. 
According to a poptJar view (found already in Harr 1994: 71, 106, 247) whereas the 
Americans have adopted a constrained sovereign, the British have not. Translated to 
the language of contemporary jurisprudence tMs means that moral considerations 
mal{e up part of the American rule of recognition but not part of the British one. 
There are various problems with this claim, not least that it assumes that what is 
at stal<e between competing jurisprudential theories are different perceptions of 
legal valjdity. 19 In the present context, this view fails to capture the sense in which 
the British constitution is fundamentally a political, not a legal, entity (it is difficult 
to talk about a "document" in this context). It is a constitutional structure in which 
"(e]ve1ything that happens is constitutional. And if nothing happened that would 
be constitutional also" (Griffith 1979: 19).20 It is from this that law is understood 
as simply the voice (the "command," if you don't mind the Austinism) of whoever 
happens to be in power. Sovereignty on this view is the power to make laws. It is a 
power that the otherwise unlimited sovereign can choose to create legal limits on its 
law-making power. This is, effectively, the way Hart interprets the US Constitution 
(Harr 1994: 68- 9), and this is how today the Human Rights Act is reconciled with 
the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. By contrast, in the United States 
sovereignty is ultimately understood to vest in the people (Wood 2002: 159- 62), 
and the Constitution, created by the people, is thought to award some limited 
powers, including limited law-malcing powers, to the different branches of 
government. As such .the law is understood fundamentally not as the manifestation 
of political authority, but as what sets its limits (cf. Bailyn 1992: 175-81, 185-8, 
201- 3). In the British picture judicial engagement in politics is ultimately an 
is Though popular (especially among philosophers), the view that morality is largely unchanging is 
not universally accepted. My view is that Dworkin, despite his endorsement of moral objectivity, 
rejects this position. This by itself is a significant aspect of his work, that is very relevant to understand-
ing his jurisprudence, but not one I can consider here. 
19 I challenge this view in Priel (20lla). 
20 Griffith's terms arc stark, but the idea is an old one. Bagehot expressed a similar idea when he said 
(1963: 221) that "The ultimate authority in the English Constitution is a newly-elected House of 
Commons." On the decline of the idea of fundamental law in Britain see Gough (1961: 168-207). 
336 Dan Priel 
illegitimate attempt to usurp political power, to undermine the sovereign; in the 
American one, judicial engagement in politics is an (almost) inevitable outcome of 
the need to make sure governmem does not exceed its given powers. 
This is the philosophical divide that makes intelligible so many of the differences 
between law and politics between the two countries. These two views emanate from 
two very different underlying political theories about what makes the use of 
political power legitimate, and they shape the most basic features of what law is 
in these two countries. Yee in the present picture all this is created as irrelevant to 
understanding the nature of law, quite possibly exactly because these differences are 
the result of competing political theories. But once we see chis, much of what I said 
above tllat was inexplicable in the "validity-first" pictW'e that is dominant in 
contempora1y jurisprudence begins to make sense. It is not simply that the United 
States and Britain have different tests of validity. It is that they have different 
political traditions, which result in a different understanding of what law is, which 
in tum explains numerous practical differences between their legal systems. 
5. T he implications for the search for the nature of law 
John Gardner once described Dworkin's work as that of a "theoretically ambitious 
lawyer" (Gardner 2004: 173), suggesting that for all that is valuable or interesting in 
it, it is not really legal philosophy. I suspect my argument would be classified in the 
same way: indeed, exactly because my discussion reveals such differences between 
American and British law it might be judged irrelevant to the question of the nature 
oflaw. I suspect what I have said so far might be similarly dismissed as insufficiently 
philosophical. There were just too many facts, too much histoty, perhaps even too 
much law, to count as proper legal philosophy. These are exactly the kind of 
contingent matters that legal philosophet's consider to be the domain of others. 
Rather than a reason for criticizing legal philosophers, one might say my discussion 
so far shows chat they have been correct to ignore all these matters. 
In proper philosophical style, then, let me present a syllogism: 
(1) T here is no right answer to what constitutes cctrue" politics, or no single 
account of the legitimacy of the state; there is, if you wish, no non~political 
((nature" to politics to be discovered through conceptual analysis. 
(2) Different states have different forms ("conceptions") of politics that reflect 
their different values, traditions, and history. 
(3) The1:e are connections between law and policies. 
(4) Different understandings of politics result in different roles, understandings, 
forms ("conceptions") of law in different states. 
(5) The different conceptions of law go to the heart of what on any plausible 
view of the matter counts as the nature of law. 
Hence: (6) The search for the (single, unique) nature of law is misguided. 
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I did not argue for (1), but I assume (and hope) it would not be controversial. 
Denying it is hardly going to help the search for the nature of law, for that would 
only mean that for the sake of an account of the latter, legal philosophers (unless 
they deny (3)) would have to develop a side-specialty of identifying the true 
nature of politics. In any case, my demonstration of (2) above can be seen as 
validation of (1) as well. (3) too is, I think, uncontroversial. It is the remaining 
premises, (4) and especially (5), that are likely to evoke most resistance, but my 
argument in the last section has shown, I hope, rhe ve1y different understanding 
of politics in the two countries, and how they result in a profoundly different 
understanding of what law is. To reiterate just one point noticed by Hart, the 
dominant idea of freedom in Britain saw it as the opposite of law; in che United 
States, freedom was a product of law. This is a fundamental divide that explains 
not just the fundamentally different understandings of what counts as law, but 
also many of the lower-level differences between law in these two countries. The 
alternative advocated here to the prevailing jurispruden rial orthodoxy claims that 
these facts must figure in any attempt at depicting the "nature" of American and 
British law. I argue that any inquily that purports to account for law's "self-
understanding" but cannot account for these differences, fails in the cask it secs for 
itself. 
Those who wish to reject my argument might contend chat at best what it 
shows is the need for mal<lng discussions on the nature of law more abstract. 
Now, of course, one may define the term "nature of law" any way one wishes 
and it is definitely possible to define it to mean those necessary features we 
happen to find in all legal systems. Even then I thinl< my argument above 
shows that one is likely to find much less than most legal philosophers seem to 
think. More importantly, even if the nature of law simply means those things 
that are necessarily true of all legal systems, one would then wonder why 
this question is of any interest: Is philosophy in the business of collecting 
necessa1y truths about things in the world? The search for the nature of law was 
presumably considered worth engaging in because it was believed that by 
engaging in it one could learn something valuable about a certain social 
practice; it was believed that the search for the nature of law was somehow 
illuminating of the law. The solution suggested here avoids the challenge posed 
by giving the term -''nature of law" a purely technical meaning and by stripping 
this l<lnd of inquiry of value. This solution to my challenge, then, looks more 
like an admission of defeat. 
If the search for the nature of law is to be meaningful, and if it is to bear some 
resemblance for what most people mean when they talk about the "nature ofX" or 
"essence of X," namely an inquiry that gives us the most significant aspects of a 
certain phenomenon, such an inquiry should be understood in quite different 
terms. I propose, informally, that a fact belongs to the nature of a thing if it 
explains many other facts about it. Slightly more formally, a fact F is part of the 
nature of social practice S if (and only if?) it figures in an explanation of many 
features of S. Even the more formal definition is still imprecise, but for my purposes 
here it will do. I propose th~t the way the relationship between American and 
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British law and politics is pan of each legal system's nature, as defined here, for one 
thing we have seen above is that the relationship between each legal system and 
politics was part of the explanation of very many aspects of each; and though I have 
said nothing about it, they are also relevant for explaining some of the differences 
between the content of the laws of those legal systems. 
All this does not amount to a logical proof, but it does amount to a demonstra-
tion that two legal systems have a very different understanding of what law is as a 
result of their different political traditions and their corresponding differences in 
understanding the relationship between law and politics. There is, however, a 
logical challenge I can direct at defenders of the nature of law project: the issues 
raised in this chapter can be deemed irrelevant only if American law and British law 
belong to the same kind, otherwise the differences between them are simply irrele-
vant to the question of each legal system's respective nature. In other words, there is 
a different way of understanding my argument, i.e. as the claim that American law 
and British law are different kinds, in which case the set of facts I described about 
each law may be necessaiy for understanding its nature but irrelevant to under-
standing the nature of the other. Put differently, my point is that when proponents 
of the prevailing understanding of nature of law rely on examples from both British 
and American law in support of their views on the nature of law, they assume 
without argument that the two are species of the same kind. However, from a 
logical point of view there is warrant in doing so and there is no telling whether they 
are right on this matter. Since there is no fact of the matter on this question, the 
assumption that they are-an assumption that is crucial for the entire enterprise of 
the search for the nature of law-is unwarranted. Furthermore, this assumption can 
only make sense if one implicitly assumes some further substantive views about what 
law is. The whole enterprise is thus in some sense circular as it can only get off the 
ground by presupposing the truth of certain premises that are presented at the end 
of the inquiry as f£ndings about the nature of law. (This problem is complicated 
many times over when other legal systems, contempora1y, historical, some may 
even want to add hypothetical, are added to the story.) 
To amplify this last point imagine you had been asked to offer an account of the 
nature of American law or the nature of British law, a sort of account of the central 
features of the legal system, one that includes the self-understanding of lawyers in 
each of these legal systems as to the enterprise they are engaged in. We could 
conclude that British and American law belonged to the same kind only at the end of 
our inquiry if we found our that the accounts of each that we had previously offered 
turned out to have a roughly identical core and that their cUfferences were only 
confined to those aspects rhat we had not considered as part of either legal system's 
core. But if we attempted to undertake such an inquily and found out that the 
accounts were conflicting at their core that would imply that these two legal systems 
do not belong ro the same kind. My claim in this chapter is that when we do just 
that, it turns out lhat the two legal systems indeed conflict at their core. Of course, 
I may be wrong about that, but until something like this is tried- and I know of no 
legal philosopher writing on the nature of law who tried to do that-the entire 
project rests on wholly question-begging assumptions. 
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Perhaps, however, we may understand the search for the "nature of law" more 
weakly, i.e. as noc actually concerned with finding the nature of law. Instead this 
term might simply designate an attempt to look at law from some greater distance, 
without any commicmenc to classificat01y accmacy. Is the difference between my 
views and those of legal philosophers looking for the nature of law nothing more 
than that chey prefer the long shot view whereas I am more interested in the close 
up? I do not deny that standing at some "distance" from a phenomenon can reveal 
what a closer look may miss Qackson and Pettit 2004). Even understood in this 
more relaxed way, however, there is a serious problem with it, for if this is the 
reason for the search for the nature oflaw, then the right distance from the object of 
inquiry is not to be determined by the object· of inquity. Rather, it must be chosen 
by legal philosophers according to criteria that are external to the object of inquiry. As 
on this view there is no correct degree of "zoom," the only appropriate way of 
choosing between various possible distances must be determined according to what 
we gain from the explanation. If that is the case, my view is that in their search for the 
nature of law legal philosophers have been standing too far from the law, and that 
some of the debates that preoccupied legal philosophers in the la.st few years under 
the banner of the nature of law were deeply unilluminating of their object of 
inqui1y. Don't tal<e my word for it: on this interpretation of the search for che 
nature ofJaw a good test for the optimal "distance" from an object of inquiry is the 
degree of interest others find in it. The fact that both legal academics and moral and 
political philosophers (let alone practitioners or lay people) have not found much of 
irtterest in these debates, is more than suggestive of the fact that the distance from 
the object chosen by legal philosophers has been the wrong one. 
Opting for the distant explanation can also lead to the opposite problem, viz. the 
tendency to assume the local and familiar is general and universal. I have al ready 
suggested what may be a problem in the work of both Hart and Dworkin: an 
assumption that one can extrapolate from the legal system one is familiar with to 
universal claims about the nature of law. Let me illustrate this point with another 
example. A few years ago there was an internet debate on the question why A11glo-
American legal scholars cake relatively little interest in the work of Hans Kelsen and 
in deontic logic, both topics on which legal philosophers from continental Europe 
write much more. The debate attracted many prominent legal philosophers, who 
offered various explanations.21 I read this exchange and was struck by the fact that, 
with the exception of one fleeting comment (by an Italian, made with regard to 
Kelsen), no one mentioned what I thought was the obvious explanation. Kelsen's 
legal thought, despite his many yea.rs in the United States, remained firmly rooted 
in a particular conception oflaw that is closer to what one finds in civil law systems. 
Once it is recognized that for all its abstraction Kelsen's approach fits some legal 
systems better than others, the puzzle is solved. The same is true of deoncic logic. 
Deontic logic would be considered importan t for analyzing legal argument in a legal 
21 See <http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfSblawg/2007 /1 O/why-no-deontic-.htinb; <http://prawfs 
blawg.blogs.com/ prawfsblawg/2007 /1 O/why-no-kelsen.hunl>; <http://leiredegalphilosophy. rypepad. 
com/leitcr/2007I10/why-dont-amer71.htmb (all visited, April 8, 2011). 
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system that puts a premium on deductive argumentation. This is exactly what one 
finds. A prominent German legal scholar has recently written that even today "[t]he 
typical German judgment, like its French counterpart, strives after the ideal of 
deductive reasoning" (Zimmermann 2005: 27, also 38; similarly Markesinis 1986: 
366). By contrast, legal philosophers &om common law jurisdictions, told from 
Day One of law school that "[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been 
experience" (Holmes 1881: 1),22 are much less likely to think that deontic logic is 
going to capture anything important about the law. 
I point out these vestigial localisms in supposedly general theories of the nature 
of law not in order to castigate particular legal theori~s for their insufficient 
generality, but to point out that legal philosophers' tendency to stand far away 
from legal practice, their relative lack of interest in the nitty-gritty details of the 
organization of particular legal systems, all adopted in the name of the search for the 
nature of law, may actually result in too quick generalizations from few familiar 
cases and thus undermine the inquily for the nature of law. 
Perhaps noticing the difficulties with talking about the nature of law in general, 
several legal philosophers have turned in recent years to talking about "our" concept 
of law (e.g. Raz 2009: 94-5). Unfortunately, this seemingly more modest claim 
suffers for the same problem of demarcation: Quite simply, there is no logical way 
of demarcating "our" concept of law without circularity unless we have a non-
question-begging way of demarcating who "we" are, and none of those who 
suggested this possibility has even hinted towards a way of addressing this question. 
This is not a fanciful complaint. In challenging the search for the nature of law 
I relied not on anthropological studies of small pre-industrial communities living in 
the thick of the Amazon rainforests, not on the law of an ancient and now extinct 
political community, not on the law in contemporaiy Russia,23 not even on the 
distinction between common law ai1d civil law that some have suggested involved 
some fundamentally different ways of thinking (Legrand 1997). I looked at the 
two legal systems from which the most prominent analytic legal philosophers 
hail, two legal systems that share a long histo1y. If" our" does not include both of 
them, I do not see what this word is supposed to cover. 
At this point the challenger may reply that I am wrong to say that we have no way 
of knowing that American and British law ai·e not the same kind: after all, people "treat 
them as belonging to the same kind, which is why, for example, they consider it a 
valuable exercise to compare them. This response, however, is both unconvincing 
and self-defeating. It is unconvincing, because it is asserted rather than shown. The 
fact that people use the same word to describe both is not sufficient to tell us that the 
word is used to refer co the same kind. rw e are, after all, repeatedly reminded that 
legal philosophy is not lexigraphy.) This usage is perfectly acceptable for everyday 
22 Several American philosophers (e.g. Dewey 1924; Cohen 1916) have expressed similar views on 
law. Many other statements expressing the same idea from English and American judges and scholars 
arc found in Waddams (2003: 1- 2). 
23 For example Ascherson (2004): "when [Putin] says 'law' he means what we would call 'order'." 
The issue is discussed further in Kahn (2006) and Kurkchiyan (2003). 
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purposes, but it does not require commitment to the view that the things described 
by the same word share certain necessaiy fearures. In fact, my guess is that if you 
asked some British lawyers what they thought of American law, many of them would 
reply "it has the appearai1ce oflaw, but it really is politics masquerading as law,"24 or, 
more politely, that American law is a ve1y different beast from British law. This 
answer is also self-defeating because if we take people's attitudes seriously then we 
should pay at least as much attention to their profound thoughts and self-understand-
ing of their own legal system as to their superficial comparisons with others. Put 
differently, one cannot invoke people's attitudes at one point and ignore them 
completely at another. And it has been exactly my claim that those attitudes are 
profoundly different in Britain and the United States. 
6. Some further objections answered 
I foresee four additional objections to the position taken here. The first is that the 
argument must be wrong because the existence of a debate on the question of the 
nature of law shows that there is something that the disputants are talking about. 
Andrei Marmor (2001 : 6) once wrote that "controversy over the content of a rule of 
recognition does not prove chat there is no such a rule. Even when there are several 
ways of understanding a rule (or anything else for that matter), there must be 
something there that people can understand differently and argue about." Though 
the context of this remark was different, Marmor' s parenthetical remark shows he 
considers his point to be general. Transferred to our context the argument would be 
that the fact that people disagree about the nature of law shows that such a thing 
exists. Unfortunately, this is a bad argument. Controversy may be the result of 
shared mistaken belief over the existence of something that in fact does not exist. No 
one (I hope) would infer rhe existence of God merely from the existence of debates 
about the nature of God. In our context, debates about the nature oflaw could exist 
so long as participants share the mistaken belief that such a thing exists. The 
pmpose of this chapter is exactly to challenge this belief. 
A second objection is the opposite of one of the objections considered above, i.e. 
that I have been tendentious in my choice of two very different legal systems for 
discussion. There is American exceptionalism (including American legal exception-
alism) on one side and British exceptionalism (in not having a written constitution) 
on the other. If I had chosen different countries, I would not have gotten such 
different outcomes. There are, however, several problems with this objection. One 
is, of course, that in some respects the American and the British legal systems are 
fairly close: they are both legal systems of Western developed countries with a long 
shared history. And as already mentioned, these happen to be the cow1tries from 
which the most prominent analytic legal philosophers come from, and it is very rare 
indeed to hear them thinking of either (or both) of these legal systems as somehow 
24 I have not conducted a survey but Srevens (2009: 651) and Birks (1996: 98- 9) come close co 
saying just that. 
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an outlier in the search for the nature oflaw (especially when the whole point of the 
search for the nature of law is to find those features from which there are no 
outliers).25 The most important point, however, is that the moment one scam 
looking closely, virtually eve1y country is "exceptional" in one way or another. 
French law and German law are the paradigmatic examples of civil Jaw jurisdic-
tions, and yet there are important fundamental differences between them; German 
law has served as the model of much Chinese law, but there are fundamental 
differences beLween German and Chinese law as well. This does not entail (nor did 
I argue) that each legal system has its own "nature,>' or even that nothing 
illuminating can be said about law in general. It says,. however, that in order to 
identify without circularity what belongs to the object of inquiry one must identify 
a certain role that law plays within a certain social or political organization. Because 
of the variety of such organizations, it cannot be assumed in advance that the thing 
called "law" in all of them will have the same nature. This is only something we 
could find at the end of our inquity. 
This point leads to the third challenge, and that is that my argument in fact 
shows that law has a nature, namely that the law is concerned with objectivity. The 
critic may even go on to quote me saying cl1at there is "tension between the aims for 
objectivity in the law and its subject-matter." Can I make this statement without 
assuming law has some nature? This is an important point for clarifying the scope of 
my argument. First, as already said, I do not deny that there are certain observations 
true of both American and British law (and quite possibly of other legal systems). 
There may even be observations true oflegal systems more generally. But to observe 
at legal systems and notice some things they have in common is not philosophy, 
and it is best done with recognized fact-gathering techniques that, to put it gently, 
are not the mark of contemporary legal philosophy. Second, there may be some 
"philosophical" questions (whatever that means exactly) that arise with regard to 
many, perhaps even all legal systems. But these «puzzles,, (as I called them in Priel 
2007b: 193-5), need not, singly or together, amount to anything that could 
plausibly be called the nature of law (unless one uses this term in the purely 
technical sense mentioned above), nor do these puzzles become less puzzling if 
they are found to be true of only some legal systems. Most importantly, there is no 
reason to think in advance that even if the same puzzle arises in all legal systems, 
that the answer to it will be the same in all legal systems. To pick a favorite puzzle, it 
is perfectly possible that we will have one explanation for the normativity of law in a 
contemporary modern welfare-state democracy and quite another one in a medieval 
feudal society. We have seen a different understanding of the relationship between 
law and politics between British and American law; the differences may be even 
greater in a place where an absolute monarch declares "the state is me.,, Since law is 
not something that falls on societies from the sky with a note "take me or leave me,, 
25 Atiyah and Summers (1987: 256, 411-20) is a rare (and perhaps for this reason neglected) 
exception. 
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attached, it can be (and has been) molded according to the particular political 
culture in which it exists. No one doubts the truth of this claim as far as the content 
of law is concerned; what I do here is extend it to the deeper and more general 
elements of different legal systems. 
The last objection I can foresee is that what I have ·argued so far is a kind 
of a skeptical claim. As such it may be an amusing intellectual game, but like other 
skeptical claims we should really ignore it and go on with our daily business, 
including philosophers' daily business, which has always been the identification 
of the nature of things. However, if my claim is "skeptical" in any sense, it is 
skeptical only with regard to a particular, and in historical terms recent, under-
standing of jurisprudence. In the English-spealcing world it was not before John 
Austin that jurisprudence was understood in this way (and I would argue that even 
he is a questionable case). Before him there is simply no one that I know of, 
definitely not Bentham or Hobbes, who was concerned with the question of the 
nature of law in the manner chis term is understood these days. It was only around 
fifty or so years ago that Anglophone legal philosophy turned in earnest to this 
question (in German-language jurisprudence things may have begun a bit earlier); 
this happened at a particular point in history, when other branches of Anglophone 
philosophy were also interested in questions of a similar lcind. And yet in other areas 
these questions were fairly quickly abandoned: already in 1979 Brian Barry, who 
knew a thing or two about the time and place in which this sort of inquiry 
flourished, wrote mockingly about questions of this sort, "I cannot remember 
when I last read a djscussion about the criteria for a good cactus or an extra-fancy 
apple" (Barry 1979: 632).26 It is, I think, no coincidence that the revival in political 
philosophy, pronounced dead in 1960s, took place at the time that interest in such 
"conceptual" questions declined, and by now, in many branches of philosophy the 
search for the "nature" of things has come under attack and has been largely 
abandoned. 27 
26 But unlike ocher areas of philosophy this sore of question seems to be alive and well in 
jurisprudence (Dickson 2009). le is notable that it is mostly legal positivists who seem concerned 
with these sorts of questions, whereas natural lawyers like Finnis and Dworkin dismiss them as 
unimportant. This should have alerted legal positivists co the face that these nacural lawyers are not 
in the business of giving an analysis of tbe nature of law, but racher of giving a political (non-neutral) 
account of law. Many of the apparent tensions Dickson finds in the work of Finnis (Dickson 2009: 
170-3), disappear if this is realized. In che case of Dworkin, che matter is discussed in more detail in 
Priel (201 I a). 
27 Sec e.g. in metaphysics: Van Fraassen (2002): chapter 1 entitled "Agafost Analytic Metaphysics;" 
in epistemology Stich (1990: 19-21): section entitled "The Irrelevance of Analytic Epistemology;" 
Kitcher (1992); .in ethics Darwall ec al. (1992: 123): describing how "[m]oral philosophers shed the 
obsessions of analytic metaethics;" Timmons (1999: 15-30): describing the move from analytic to 
post-analytic metaethics); in philosophy of mind Fodor (2004); and generally Harman (1999). They 
could all be wrong, of course, but to suggest that abandoning the search for che nature of law is 
somehow anti-philosophit"al displays lack of awareness on what some of the world's leading philoso-
phers think is (and is nor) philosophy. 
..... 
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7. From the nature of law to human nature? 
Does this mean that it makes no sense to talk about the "nature" oflaw? If we mean 
by this term what most legal philosophers have given it in the last fifty yea.rs, then 
I believe the inevitable answer is "yes. "28 The only way to avoid the problems 
raised here is to engage in normative inquiry. Whatever its faults may be such an 
account would not suffer from the problem of circularity identified above. Such 
an account can be more sociological or historical-seeking to understand the 
development of law in a certain time or place, to answe.r what law was for those 
living then, or it can be more directly normative, seeking to explain where law fits 
within a political theory, what law must be in order to be legitimate. On certain 
assumptions the latter account may be universal in the sense that it applies in all 
places, not in the sense that it exists in all places. (Claiming universality for such 
an account presupposes chat there is one way law may be legitimate, and chis 
assumption may be false.) 
Perhaps, however, there is a completely different way of thinking about the way 
to get co a universal account of the nature of law. Perhaps the nature of law is not a 
matter to be discovered by a priori reflection on law, but rather by looking more at 
humans and their nature. This idea may sound new, but it is in fact one as ancient as 
jurisprudence, and it is only the lack of interest of most legal philosophers in the 
history of their subject (prior to 1961) that may have obscured this point. It is part 
and parcel of the natural law tradition, and it is also central to the work of those 
often considered the first legal positivists, Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham. 
Since this organizing idea has been rejected, probably with the work of John Austin, 
jurisprudence has been losing its way (Priel unpublished).29 
A conrribudng factor for the lack of interest in human nature may have been the 
skepticism towards the idea in the humanities and social sciences around the time 
Hart published The Concept of Law. More recently, however, the idea of human 
nature has undergone something of a revival. Building on work in psychology and 
anthropology that idencified numerous traits and habits found in all human 
societies (Pinker 2002: 435-9, passim), there have been some attempts to extend 
these ideas to law (Kar 2006; Guttentag 2009; Mikhail 201 1). Without passing 
judgments on any of the particular ideas defended in these works, I will say that 
I am sympathetic to the view that scientific findings could contribute to questions 
that have traditionally been thought co belong to philosophy (Priel 2011 b; Priel 
28 For the sake of completeness 1 should add that my argument here is not the only one I have 
advanced against rhis sort of inquiLy. Others appear in Priel (2007b, 2008). Against the "case study" 
approach of che pre.sent chapter, the approach taken in these two essays in more abstract. 
29 In Hart (1994: 193- 200) we still see the remains of this approach in the brief discussion of the 
minimum content of natural law. It contains some, broadly Humean, remarks about human nature, 
but even these are mostly negative (i.e. an attempt to chaJlenge what he considered co be mistaken 
views about human nature espoused by natural law theorists) and their relevance for undemanding the 
content laws are likely to have, but not the basis for Hart's positive account oflaw. Even this minimal 
concern for human nature is gone in more recent work by legal positivists, who have cold us that an 
account of the nature of law must be able to explain what law is even for non-human societies. 
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20 l 2a). It is worth bearing in mind, however, char at this stage the research this 
work is based on is still conrroversial, and irs relevance to jurisprudence raises 
additional difficulries. I cannot discuss these issues here, but I wish to highlight two 
points about how different this approach would be from the currently dominant 
view in jurisprudence. First, these inquiries rely heavily on factual discoveries of 
social and cognitive scientists, whose methods are ve1y different from those used by 
contemporary legal philosophers. Second, the substantive results of this approach 
are also likely to look quite different from those of contemporary jurisprudence. 
The "direction" of their argument is from human narw·e to the nature oflaw, rather 
than from observations abour law to the natme of law. Fully cognizant of rhe fact 
that there are considerable differences between legal systems, this sort of approach is 
unlikely to try to distil rhe few features that mal<e something into a legal sysrem, but 
rather try and identify what facts about human nature entail (if anything at all) 
about the shape legal institutions are likely to take. Though the aspiration is to 
identify some such universal tendencies among humans, it does not require the 
discovery of necessary truths. 
What such inquiries might reveal about law is not a topic I can address in a few 
pages. The only purpose of the discussion has been to show where I think legal 
philosophers should be looking if they seek more universaHst findings about law in 
general. But ending on this note may seem to undermine the thrust of eve1ything 
I have said before. That, however, is not a challenge to me, but to reality. It reflects 
one of the most difficult questions in the explanation of all of human affairs, namely 
how to reconcile the fact of universal human nature with the fact of immensely 
different cultures. Swings in popular and academic opinion on the matter-the 
sixties and seventies were the "relativistic" decades, and now universalism is on the 
up3°-reflect the extent to which this complex question may be influenced by 
shifting fashions, bur it seems clear that there is quite a bit of both in all human 
societies, and that a complete account of social institutions would have to rake 
account of both. 
Legal philosophers may have thought that they could contribute co the universal 
end of the inquily by taldng on questions that seemed to be independent of 
scientific inquiry and even human nature: the "nature" of law is not a question 
that seems amenable to scientific inquhy (Priel 20 l 2a), bur the difficulties with this 
sort of inquity, some of which have been shown here, make this alternative 
unattractive. The universalist alternative proposed here avoids these difficulties, 
bur poses a different challenge to legal philosophers. Puc bluntly, it seems to leave 
little room for philosophical contribution now that the research on human nature 
has largely been taken up by scientists. This means legal philosophers will have 
to rethink what they are doing. One possibility is for them to serve as a kind of 
3° Consider the following titles: The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language (Pinker 
1994): "The Moral lnsrinct" (Pinker 2008); The Art lmtinct: Beauty, Plemure, and Human Evoltttion 
(Dutton 2010); The Faith Instinct: How Religion Evolved Why It Endures (Wade 2009); "The Property 
'Instinct'" (Stake 2004); "Is There a Law Instincr?" (Gutrenrag 2009); The Compassionate Instinct: The 
Science of Human Goodness (Keltner er al. 2010). 
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go-between ttying to connect the general, scientific inquiry on human nature with 
the diverse, normative examination of diverse social institutions. Beyond that, legal 
theorists will have to turn to political theory and explain the place of law within it. 
Thus, in the end, we reach a conclusion similar to the one I have made in the 
beginning of this section: jurisprudents are most like to mal{e a real contribution by 
adopting a more consciously normative approach to legal theory, one that relies on 
scientific findings on human nature for the sake of a better theo1y of the proper role 
of law. To do that, however, legal philosophers must be willing to open up their 
discipline both to political the01y and to scientific work on human nature. 
8. Conclusion 
This has been a story with a twist. Much of the work in jurisprudence of the last fifty 
years has been concerned with the discove1y of objective tmth about the "nature" of 
law. What I have argued here is that to find the answer to this question one needs to 
understand the way the idea of objectivity in law is understood, and how different 
political traditions have led to different characterizations of law in response to the 
problem of objectivity. If one accepts that there is no one way of understanding the 
relationship between law and politics and that the way this relationship is understood 
touches upon and affects the most basic aspects of what law is, then it follows that 
there is also no single answer to the question of the nature of law. 
Why has this conclusion eluded some ve1y sophisticated thinkers? One reason 
must be that the debate about the nature of law has been framed as a debate about 
the relationships between law and morality. But the focus on the relationships, 
necessary or otherwise, between law and morality has obscured from view questions 
about the relationships between law and politics, questions which arguably are far 
more important for understanding law in the modem regulatory state. Understand-
ing the law-politics relationship calls for more attention to law's daily workings-
the way judges understand their position in relation to other branches of govern-
ment, the way judges are appointed, th.e way they write their opinions, the way law 
is taught, as well as the way political elites perceive the right way of solving social 
problems. It requires a broader view of what law does: It is no coincidence, I think, 
that when legal philosophers write about substantive law they focus on common 
law areas, those that fit the law- morality divide far better than areas such as 
securities regulation or administrative law (which highlight the law- politics divide). 
One of the unfortunate impllcations of the focus on the "nature" of law within 
jurisprudence is that those working in jurisprudence have come to see all this as 
irrelevant· detail, not sufficiently interesting or impo1tant for serious philosophical 
reflection. The result has been a growing gulf, almost a conceptual separation, 
between law and jurisprudence. If nothing else, I hope this chapter has shown that 
this has not helped make jurisprudential debates more philosophically sophisticated 
or better focused, and it has not helped to get us closer to finding the general features 
of law. 
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